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The CDSP [Counterdrug Support Program] demonstrates a model 
that provides an exponential improvement to the capabilities of 
every participating agency.  It enhances the operations and 
interoperability of agencies by providing a mechanism to improve 
coordination, communications, training, and planning.  How is this 
done?  The CDSP can be thought of as the hub of a bicycle tire.  
The multiple agencies with a drug-related focus could be thought of 
as the tread of the tire.  Spokes, obviously connect the hub to the 
tire.  In this analogy, the spokes represent the conduits of 
information, coordination, and assistance that run between the 
CDSP hub and the individual agencies.  Although the hub does not 
roll on the ground, it holds the wheel of agencies together and 
ultimately helps all agencies to roll more smoothly and effectively 
together.  By functioning as a supporting agency, not a supported 
or primary agency, the CDSP produces a synergistic effect that 
improves all agencies.  A similar approach might produce equally 
important improvements to agency cooperation, interoperability, 
and communications in the areas of preventing and responding to 
major acts of terrorism in our homeland.1 
⎯Major General Philip Oates, Adjutant General of Alaska 
“Supporting the National Strategy For Homeland Security:           
The Role Of The National Guard” 
 
National Guard Counterdrug (CD) personnel and equipment should be 
made dual-use for Homeland Security (HLS) in order to leverage existing 
resources and act as a force multiplier that can provide a rapid, effective military 
response to HLS.  If NG CD assets are expanded into HLS, the Governors will 
have the flexibility of having highly trained and equipped soldiers for HLS 
activities that can be utilized according to the needs of the state and the current 
threat level.  
                                            
1 Philip Oates. “Supporting the National Security for Homeland Security:  The Role of the 
National Guard.”  Perspectives on Preparedness.  No. 8 (August 2002), 6-7. 
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In this thesis, the challenges of creating an integrated Counterdrug and 
Homeland Security Program will be explored and then recommendations for 
addressing the challenges will be presented.  Specifically, an existing National 
Guard integrated Counterdrug and Homeland Security Program in West Virginia 
will be analyzed and the challenges this program faced in the areas of funding, 
personnel, and legal restrictions will be explored.  A proposal for an integrated 
CD-HLS program that addresses these challenges will then be presented, 
including recommendations for specific HLS missions to supplement the existing 
NG CD Support Program. 
      
A. DESCRIPTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PROBLEM 
 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 highlighted the vulnerability 
of our nation and mobilized our country to strengthen our homeland security 
prevention and response efforts.  The Department of Defense is currently in the 
process of defining its role in providing for the security of our homeland.  
Although the exact dimensions of the National Guard’s role in homeland security 
have not yet been defined, it is clear that it will play some kind of role.   
In recent years, the National Guard has been assigned a number of 
homeland security missions and all indications are that this role will only continue 
to increase in the future. The National Guard has a well-established domestic 
emergency response capability that can be built upon in the future to provide a 
significant response to domestic terrorism.2 The National Guard in State status is 
not limited by Posse Comitatus, which restricts federal military personnel from 
providing assistance to law enforcement agencies.   Congress has already 
tasked the National Guard with a role in homeland security.  Since 1999, 
Congress has authorized and funded forty-four National Guard Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Civil Support teams.  To date, thirty-two teams have been 
established, trained and equipped to support the local Incident Commander by 
                                            
2 Ibid., 2. 
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identifying Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive 
(CBRNE) substances, assessing consequences and advising on a suitable 
response.   
The National Guard was called out in the aftermath of September 11th to 
play a homeland security role.  The National Guard was prepared and responded 
immediately to numerous calls for assistance by civilian authorities at both the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The New York National Guard assisted 
law enforcement agencies with security missions and they supported first 
responders with recovery efforts.  The Air National Guard flew Combat Air Patrol 
missions over U. S. cities to protect American airspace.  The President asked the 
Governors to protect the airports and within hours National Guard personnel 
responded.  The Governors utilized National Guard forces to protect critical 
infrastructure in their respective states including bridges, nuclear power plants, 
and federal buildings.  The President activated additional National Guard troops 
to augment security at the borders to facilitate the flow of commerce. 
On February 15, 2001, the influential Hart-Rudman Commission 
recommended in their Phase III report that the Secretary of Defense designate 
homeland security as a primary mission for the National Guard and organize, 
equip and train the National Guard to do that mission.3  Recently, the National 
Guard Bureau itself has reorganized to define its role in homeland security.  On 
July 1, 2003, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General H. 
Steven Blum, combined the Counterdrug and Homeland Defense responsibilities 
under single leadership at the National Guard Bureau.4  General Blum also 
recommended to all of the Adjutants General to reorganize into Joint State 
Headquarters and consolidate some of their functions by October 1, 2003.  In 
twenty-five states, the Adjutant General also serves as the highest-ranking 
                                            
3 U. S. Commission on National Security.  Road Map for National Security:  Imperative for 
Change, Phase III Report (Washington, D. C.:  U. S. Commission on National Security/21st 
Century, February 15, 2001), 25. 
 
4 National Guard Bureau, Organization and Functions of National Guard Bureau, Provisional 
Memorandum, (Arlington, VA:  National Guard Bureau Office of the Chief, 2003), .33. 
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civilian Emergency Management Official in the state and in fifteen states, the 
Adjutant General serves as the homeland security advisor.5   
In sum, it is clear that the National Guard is expected to play some role in 
homeland security.  There is a question about the exact dimensions of this role. 
This thesis will propose that NG CD personnel should be made dual-use for HLS.  
From its creation in 1989, this program has been successful in assisting Federal, 
State, and local law enforcement agencies and community based organizations 
fight the war on drugs throughout all 54 States and Territories.  Support for the 
creation of an integrated Counterdrug-Homeland Security Program is evident 
among some Adjutants General.  In this new post 9/11 environment, there is a 
need to leverage existing capabilities to support NG HLS activities.  The 
realization that the Department of Defense has not yet defined its prevention role 
for HLS and that states will turn to the NG for support as they are faced with the 
need to prevent attacks serves as the departure point for this study.   
  
B. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
 
This thesis took two main approaches to determining whether and how CD 
assets could be leveraged for homeland security tasks.  First, it carried out a 
systematic comparison of existing CD capabilities and possible HLS missions 
that might be assigned to the National Guard, based on a review of 
Congressional, Pentagon, NORTHCOM, and National Guard policy statements 
and documents.  Second, NG State CD coordinators completed a written survey 
to determine which States have integrated CD-HLS programs and to identify the 
challenges and possible solutions of integration.  Finally, a state integrated plan 
was researched in detail through a series of interviews, emails, and phone calls 
                                            
5 Congress, House of Representatives, Government Reform Committee, Transforming the 
National Guard; Resourcing for Readiness, Testimony by Major General Tim Lowenberg, 108th 
Cong., 2d sess., April 29, 2004, 2-3 [Transcript on-line], available from <http://reform. 




with key actors in the National Guard Counterdrug Support Program.  Based on 
this research, the thesis proposes a State integrated CD-HLS program that 
includes supplemental missions for the existing CD Support Program.   
 
C. OVERVIEW  
 
The five chapters in this thesis assist the reader in answering the following 
questions:  How can existing capabilities in the CD Support Program be 
leveraged for use in HLS missions?  What are the implications of this for how a 
NG HLS Support Program should be organized?  This chapter describes the 
problem and its significance.   
Chapter II presents a comprehensive analysis of the NG domestic 
response capability before, during, and after September 11, 2001.  The National 
Guard played a significant domestic role before 9/11 in responding to state 
emergencies, WMD incidents and supporting law enforcement agencies (LEA’s) 
in drug control efforts.  After 9/11, Congress, DOD and the National Guard have 
leveraged consequence management capabilities in order to provide an 
enhanced response to terrorist attacks but they have not focused on prevention 
efforts. Three efforts to assist with prevention will be analyzed including 
employing FSIVA teams for critical infrastructure protection, allowing intelligence 
analysts to participate in intelligence fusion centers to provide increased 
situational awareness and embedding NG personnel in law enforcement 
agencies to provide a synergistic effort for HLS interagency coordination.  
Chapter III matches CD capabilities up to HLS requirements in the 
following areas: legal authority and regulatory guidance, personnel, equipment, 
and training.  The National Guard has the appropriate regulations in place for 
supporting law enforcement operations and NG CD personnel are accustomed to 
following them.  There is a full-time Title 32 organizational structure in place with 
the NG CD program.  Special CD equipment exists that can enhance HLS 
efforts.  In addition, National Guard CD personnel not only receive unique 
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training during the week but they also continue to train with their wartime unit on 
the newest military equipment.  Proposals from other NG CD Coordinators 
regarding additional HLS missions for CD-HLS dual-use programs were 
presented in this chapter.  These include using National Guard CD schools to 
teach LEA’s involved in Counterterrorism activities, Air and Ground CD assets to 
transport first responders to an incident, and reconnaissance assets to increase 
situational awareness for LEA’s.  A case study of an established CD-HLS dual-
use program in West Virginia is also examined.  In West Virginia, among other 
CD-HLS missions, CD intelligence analysts track suspicious activities in addition 
to drug trafficking and CD ground reconnaissance teams have been cross-
trained to conduct vulnerability assessments for critical infrastructure.  
Chapter IV examines a proposal for CD-HLS integration, which includes 
making CD forces dual-use for HLS missions and adding HLS missions to the 
CD Support Program, such as Reaction Force, FSIVA team, interagency 
coordination, CD-HLS intelligence analysis, and aerial and surface 
reconnaissance.  In addition, the following challenges are analyzed in detail:  lack 
of funding, lack of personnel, and legal restrictions.  Solutions to meet the 
challenges are then presented including developing stabilized and fenced 
funding with cross-leveling up to a designated threshold, adding more dual-use 
personnel and HLS core staffing, and amending the CD statute.     
Chapter V presents conclusions from the case study, including a summary 
of key findings and recommendations for a CD-HLS dual-use program. 
Considerations for future study are suggested.  These include specifying the 
requirements of HLS for the NG and determining the balance between the NG 





II. LEVERAGING EXISTING CAPABILITIES:  THE NATIONAL 
GUARD’S HLS ROLE TO DATE 
We will leverage the units, training and resources in our existing 
warfighting capabilities to expand and enhance the roles we can 
perform in homeland security.  We will make smarter use of force 
structure, leveraging capabilities and making minor modifications to 
mission-essential task lists to geometrically increase capabilities.  
We will provide capabilities in force packages, built from 
standardized warfighting units.  We will raise the threshold at which 
commitment of federal military resources to nonwarfighting tasks 
becomes necessary.6 
⎯Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief of National Guard 
Bureau “The Army National Guard – Back to the Future” 
 
The National Guard has been involved with defending America’s 
homeland for hundreds of years and will continue for the unforeseeable future.   
The new Chief of National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Blum, has made it 
clear to the National Guard as well as various audiences in the Pentagon and 
Congress, the vision for the National Guard is to transform for the future using 
existing capabilities to improve its HLS response. This chapter will present a 
detailed description and analysis of the NG’s existing capabilities and the extent 
to which they have been leveraged to fulfill DOD’s HLS mission.  
The chapter shows that the National Guard played a significant domestic 
role before September 11th in responding to natural disasters, WMD and 
supporting LEA’s in drug control efforts.  Since the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, Congress, DOD and the NG itself have leveraged the first two 
capabilities for consequence management (i.e., responding to terrorist attacks).  
Congress has funded additional Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support 
Teams (WMD-CSTs) and the National Guard is staffing a plan to implement 
                                            
6 H. Steven Blum, Lieutenant General, “The Army National Guard – Back to the Future,” 
Association of the United States Army’s Institute of Land Warfare no. 03-3 (September 2003): 3.   
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Force Capability packages primarily geared toward operating in a CBRNE 
environment including NG Reaction Forces designed to provide a quick response 
to a terrorist attack.   
For the most part, the National Guard has not leveraged three existing CD 
capabilities that could be used to fulfill DOD’s role of helping civilian agencies 
prevent terrorist attacks.  First, critical infrastructure protection requires Full 
Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (FSIVA) teams to conduct 
vulnerability assessments, teach civilian organizations about protection 
measures, and devise crisis response plans.  Second, although the intelligence 
role for the National Guard is largely undefined, National Guard personnel should 
participate in state intelligence fusion centers assisting with intelligence analysis 
and passing critical intelligence to the new NG intelligence staff as well as 
NORTHCOM, NGB, and DOD.  Third, interagency coordination is a required 
capability for Northern Command to provide a synergistic effort among many 
different agencies. To assist with interagency coordination, NORTHCOM 
requires embedding DOD resources within the response plans of civilian 
agencies.  Except for Counterdrug issues, the NG does not currently provide for 
interagency coordination with law enforcement agencies.  
 
A. THE NATIONAL GUARD’S DOMESTIC ROLE BEFORE AND DURING 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
 
The National Guard has a well-established domestic emergency response 
capability that can be built upon in the future to provide a significant response to 
domestic terrorism.7  The National Guard enhances the states response 
capability by providing a trained, disciplined, organized, and equipped military 
force for immediate employment by the Governors during natural disasters and 
domestic emergencies.  
                                            
7 Oates, The Role of the National Guard, 2. 
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The National Guard has been informally assisting in the protection of 
national security since 1977 when the Hawaii NG flew drug law enforcement 
officers during a mission called Operation Green Harvest.8  During the following 
years, the National Guard from other states joined Hawaii in counterdrug 
activities but the NG didn’t officially receive the counterdrug mission until 1989.9  
Congress put the Department of Defense in charge of “detection and monitoring 
aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States”10 and 
established the NG CD Support Program to assist the drug control efforts of 
local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies (LEA’s). 
The nature of warfare changed in the 1990’s.  The lethality of terrorist 
threats against targets in the United States began to increase with the bombing 
of the World Trade Center in 1993.  America also faced more dangerous threats 
from the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.  That same year, Under Secretary 
of State Bartholomew testified before the House Armed Services Committee and 
stated that “We are especially concerned about the spread of biological and toxin 
weapons falling into the hands of terrorists…To date we have no evidence that 
any known terrorist organization has the capability to employ such 
weapons…However, we cannot dismiss the possibilities…It may be only a matter 
of time before terrorists do acquire and use these weapons.”11 
America endured another attack in 1995 when the Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City was bombed.  Shortly after the incident in June 1995, 
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (along with Presidential Decision Directive 62 
                                            
8 Elizabeth E. Dreiling.  The National Guard:  A Future Homeland Security Paradigm? (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS:  United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2002), 22. 
 
9 Ibid., 22-23. 
 
10 Ibid., 23. 
 
11 Department of Defense, Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for 
Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction.  (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Defense, January 1998.), 4.   
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issued in 1998) tasked Federal agencies to develop effective consequence 
management capabilities, including rapidly deployable teams that would respond 
to a terrorist attack and coordinate with other agencies.12  In addition, the 
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (also referred to as 
the Nunn-Lugar-Dominici bill) provided authorization and funding for Federal 
agencies to assist first responders by increasing its “ability to deter, prevent, 
respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks involving WMD.”13   
In 1997, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a group of experts, 
known as the “Tiger Team” to develop a plan to integrate National Guard and 
Reserve support in response to a WMD attack.  The Tiger Team conducted an 
analysis of current Department of Defense WMD capabilities and determined that 
the Department of Defense was insufficiently prepared.14  As a result, the plan 
outlined a future capability, called Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) 
elements, to enhance its WMD response.15   
In Fiscal Year 1999, Congress authorized ten of these National Guard  
RAID elements - now called Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams 
(WMD-CSTs) - to be established, trained, and equipped.  Each team is 
composed of 22 members of the Army and the Air National Guard.  The WMD-
CST’s were then expanded with an additional seventeen teams authorized by 
Congress in Fiscal Year 2000 and another five teams authorized in Fiscal Year 
2001.  All thirty-two WMD-CST’s are assigned to their Governor for a rapid 
response in support of the local Incident Commander. The mission of the WMD-
                                            
12 Bogart III, Adrian T., “Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams,” Army 
Logistician 33, no. 4, (Jul/Aug 2001): 21 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; Internet; 




14 Department of Defense, Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for 
Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction, 8.  
  
15Ibid., 20.   
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CST is to aid civil authorities by “identifying CBRNE [Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive] agents/substances, assessing 
current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and 
assisting with appropriate requests for state support.”16 
The nature of warfare changed again on September 11th, 2001.  People 
reacted in horror when they learned terrorists flew American commercial aircraft 
into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  The National Guard was 
prepared and responded immediately.  Forces were quickly deployed to the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  The New York National Guard, including 
its WMD-CST, responded to numerous calls by civilian authorities for assistance 
and National Guard CD units provided aviation support to the incident sites.     
  The National Guard has been defending the homeland and providing 
support to civil authorities since it’s inception in colonial Massachusetts in 1636.  
However, the nature of warfare has changed drastically over the last ten years 
which means the nature and importance of the homeland security mission for the 
National Guard has also changed.  The possibility for future terrorist attacks on 
U. S. soil is significant.  President Bush has declared a war on terrorism.  The 
role of the National Guard has evolved over time and must continue to evolve to 
meet this new reality. 
 
B. THE NATIONAL GUARD’S HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001  
 
The military has not previously carved out unique capabilities for 
homeland security because if they did, that might give the perception that military 
                                            
16 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, The DoD Role in Homeland Security, 
Defense Study and Report to Congress (Arlington, Virginia:  Office of the Assistant Secretary of 




units don’t need their current structure for the warfight.17  However, the terrorist 
attacks on New York City and Washington D. C. highlighted the vulnerability of 
our nation and mobilized our country to strengthen our homeland security 
prevention and response efforts.  The National Guard must now have the 
flexibility to respond effectively to a wide variety of situations in the new uncertain 
environment that America faces after the attacks on September 11th, 2001.  Both 
National Guard CD units and the WMD-CST’s have responded to requests for 
HLS support since the horrific attacks.  Counterdrug units have provided aviation 
assistance to assist with protecting critical infrastructure and securing the 
Northern Border.  The WMD Civil Support Teams have responded to hundreds of 
requests for assistance with hazardous materials including events such as the 
Anthrax attacks, the Olympics at Salt Lake City, Utah and the Space Shuttle 
Columbia crash site.       
America is now faced with a new security environment and must be 
prepared for the next terrorist attack.  The military needs to plan new homeland 
security missions.  Shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Defense 
Department released its latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which 
marked a significant shift in the military’s priorities and determined that homeland 
security would be the “primary mission of the Reserve Components”.18  The 
National Guard augments the Army and the Air Force.   The Active Components 
are the primary military response for the warfight overseas.  As a result, they 
might not have enough personnel to respond to domestic emergencies here at 
home.  Since the National Guard only provides a reserve response capability to 
both the Active Army and the Air Force overseas, they are more readily available 
to respond to acts of terror in the United States.19   
                                            
17 Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, The U.S. Army and the New National Security 
Strategy  (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 2003), 64, Book on-line; available from 
<http://www.rand.org/ publications/MR/MR1657>, Internet; accessed March 4, 2004. 
 
18 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C.: 




The QDR presents current and future capabilities and requirements for the 
military.  However, the latest guidance released in 2001 did not give specific 
guidance on types of homeland security capabilities that are required.  According 
to the Center for Defense Information, “The Defense Department has said that 
final requirements will not be set before the 2005 Quadrennial Defense 
Review.”20  Although final requirements have not been set, Congress, the 
Pentagon, NORTHCOM, and the National Guard itself have been engaged in 
efforts to delineate the role the National Guard will play in supporting homeland 
security efforts.  To date, most of the focus post 9/11 has been on leveraging the 
National Guard’s consequence management capabilities as described below. 
 
1. Congress Funds Additional WMD-CSTs 
 
Congress recognized the valuable capabilities of the National Guard and 
in Fiscal Year 2003, directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for 
creating twenty three additional WMD-CSTs.  This authorization would bring the 
total WMD-CST’s to 55, which is at least one team in every state and territory of 
the United States.  Funding for twelve of these new teams followed in Fiscal Year 
2004 and the teams are now being trained and equipped. 
 
2. DOD and Northern Command Focus on Consequence 
Management  
 
On October 1 2002, the Department of Defense consolidated several 
military missions under a single command, called United States Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM).  Its mission is as follows:   
                                            
20 Colin Robinson, Homeland Security Requirements and the Future Shape of the Army 
National Guard (Washington, D.C:  Center for Defense Information, September 4, 2003), 3. 
 
14 
Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 
aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and 
interests within the assigned area of responsibility (AOR); 
and As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, 
provide military assistance to civil authorities including 
consequence management operations.21 
Thus far, this mission has been interpreted in a fairly narrow fashion.  Mr. 
Verga, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense, describes three 
situations where DOD forces would be deployed, which are extraordinary, 
emergency, and temporary.  In extraordinary situations, also known as homeland 
defense missions, DOD would have the lead role and would deploy conventional 
forces such as Combat Air Patrols.22  The next two situations are civil support 
missions and include emergency situations or natural disasters and temporary, 
narrow-focused situations such as the Super Bowl.23  In both of these situations, 
the Department of Defense would be in a supporting role to the lead federal 
agency.   
Northern Command as well as the civilian agencies it supports are still in 
the process of defining their roles.  So far, the command has interpreted its civil 
support mission to be largely focused on consequence management even 
though their mission statement includes preventing terrorist attacks.  The one 
exception seems to be the emphasis on increasing DOD intelligence efforts.   
President Bush directed various elements within the intelligence 
community, including members from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Department of Defense, to merge into a single organization called the Terrorist 
                                            
21 Peter Verga. “NORTHCOM:  Questions and Answers on the Eve of Implementation,” 
[Transcript of speech presented at the Heritage Foundation] Washington, D.C., Heritage 
Foundation, September 26, 2002, 4, WebMemo #152; available from <http://heritage.org/ 
research/HomelandDefense/ wm152.cfm?renderforprint=1>; Internet; accessed 29 May 2004.   
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Threat Integration Center (TTIC).24  This organization is designed to help create 
a single intelligence picture, including domestic and foreign information, for 
assessing the terrorist threat and assisting with HLS intelligence fusion efforts. 
Congress also wanted to enhance HLS intelligence efforts and created a 
new position within DOD called the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
with the passage of the FY03 National Defense Authorization Act.  The mission 
of this new office is to advise the Secretary of Defense and his deputy and 
Combatant Commanders on intelligence matters.  Secretary McHale testified that 
the contribution of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to homeland 
security will be to “define and provide oversight for the Defense Department’s 
participation in national Indications and Warning.”25  The military depends on 
intelligence for Indications and Warning to counter the threat.  It includes any 
information relating the activities of hostile forces to include their intentions.   
Northern Command also has a critical need for actionable intelligence 
from government and intelligence agencies. In response to this need, 
NORTHCOM created a Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center.26  General 
Eberhart testified that the intelligence goal for NORTHCOM is “to help connect 
the dots to create a clear threat picture, playing our appropriate military role as 
part of the interagency team.”27 
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3. National Guard Develops Capability Packages 
 
Long before NORTHCOM was established, DOD directed efforts toward 
improving its CBRN capabilities in response to the passage of the 1996 Defense 
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act28 and this emphasis continues today.  
More recently, in a Report to Congress, the Department of Defense stated “Army 
and Air National Guard forces, acting under state authority (i.e. not in federal 
service), have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to state and 
local governments in civil emergencies within their respective states.”29  Since 
the National Guard is the first military force to assist civilian authorities in dealing 
with any domestic crisis, it needs to be capable of responding to all state 
emergencies, including incidents involving CBRNE.   
The Secretary of Defense recently introduced a new capabilities-based 
planning process for determining military requirements, which represents a bold 
shift from the threat-based planning process used during the last forty years.30  
As a result, all of the military services, including the National Guard, are currently 
working on integrating their capabilities into this new planning process.  The 
National Guard’s focus is on developing force capability packages for conducting 
operations in a domestic CBRNE environment, in response to Northern 
Command’s request for capabilities in this area.    
The National Guard already has a baseline capability to provide State 
emergency response and to act as a reserve to the Army and Air Force for the 
overseas warfighting mission.  The NG now seeks to build on its unique 
                                            
28 Department of Defense, Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for 
Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction, IV.   
 
29 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, The DoD Role in Homeland Security, 
Defense Study and Report to Congress, 7.  
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capability to provide rapid response and command and control in emergency 
situations.  In a proactive year-long effort by the NGB to get National Guard 
capabilities funded, staff officers aggressively coordinated a plan to use existing 
personnel, training and equipment and adjust force structure as necessary to 
enhance its homeland security role.31  At the heart of this effort are four National 
Guard force capability packages where the personnel will be trained for the 
overseas warfight but can also be used effectively for operating in a domestic 
CBRNE environment.32  The following force capability packages were 
coordinated with NORTHCOM (along with the continued fielding of National 
Guard Civil Support Teams):  converting each state headquarters to a Joint 
Force Headquarters; task organizing 12 regional National Guard CBRNE 
Enhanced Response Force Packages; and establishing National Guard Reaction 
Forces and Full Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams in each 
state.33   
First, the Adjutants General have consolidated their structure into Joint 
Force Headquarters on October 1, 2003 in order to provide a more efficient 
response to homeland security demands.  This structure provides a single source 
in every state for military support.  In addition, on July 1, 2003, the Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Blum, implemented his 
reorganization plan for the Staff Headquarters at National Guard Bureau in 
Arlington, Virginia.  As part of his plan, he combined the Counterdrug and 
Homeland Defense responsibilities under single leadership.  The two staff 
sections at National Guard Bureau will coordinate with each other when 
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Counterdrug personnel and equipment are needed to support a disaster or 
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) event.34  
Second, the National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package 
(NG CERFP) is a task force, located in each FEMA region, which would 
supplement the Civil Support Team (CST) when requested by the Incident 
Commander through the State Emergency Operations Center.  The NG CERFP 
would be composed of the 22 member CST plus 15 medical, 30 chemical, 30 
engineering and 30 security personnel.  The additional manpower would provide 
emergency medical treatment, decontamination, casualty search, extraction and 
security.35  
Third, the NG Reaction Force is a battalion-minus sized element of 
existing personnel in each state with a company as a rapid deployment force.  
The company will respond within four hours with a follow on battalion-minus 
element that will respond between 4 and 24 hours to assist with security and 
force protection missions.36 
Fourth, one Full Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (FSIVA) 
Team would be located in each state and territory and composed of fourteen 
existing Army and Air National Guard members.  The FSIVA teams would 
provide vulnerability assessments and conduct planning necessary to deploy 
soldiers to protect critical infrastructure for State and DOD facilities.37  The 
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FSIVA mission also includes conducting training to applicable civilian agencies 
on protection measures.38   
The process to develop the force capability packages provided the 
Adjutants General of each State and territory an opportunity to be involved in 
developing requirements for homeland security.  Three of the force capability 
packages that have been identified fill a gap in Northern Command’s critical 
capabilities.39  Specifically, the NG CERFP aligns with NORTHCOM’s critical 
capabilities of prompt and sustained operations and integrated command and 
control; the FSIVA teams align with NORTHCOM’s critical capabilities of 
coordinated interagency activities, integrated force protection, and responsive 
CIP; and HD operational planning and support conducted by the Joint Force 
Headquarters aligns with NORTHCOM’s critical capabilities of integrated 
command and control and coordinated interagency activities.40  In addition, the 
creation of the NG Reaction Force fulfills a “NORTHCOM request for forces 
requirement.”41  With the partial exception of the FSIVA teams, the NG force 
capability packages are devoted almost entirely to consequence management.   
The force capability packages are currently being staffed within the 
Department of Defense.  The Chief of National Guard Bureau and the 
Commander of Northern Command have approved them.  Inadequate resourcing 
for the National Guard became part of Northern Command’s highest priority 
requirements, was placed on its Integrated Priority List (IPL) and submitted to the 
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Joint Staff.42  The current Fiscal Year 2005-2009 budget process, called the 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), does not include funding for these NG 
capabilities.43  Next steps in the approval and funding process are for the Joint 
Staff to coordinate with the Combatant Commanders and review the service 
program objectives in the Spring of 2004.  If approved, the Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff will send it to the Secretary of Defense as input to the Fiscal Year 
2006-2011 POM.  
In addition to force capability packages, the National Guard Bureau has 
begun to formulate a contribution to DOD’s increased role in providing 
intelligence to homeland defense and security efforts.  The National Guard, at 
both the state and national levels, has created a brand new intelligence staff 
element.  The National Guard Bureau has not had an intelligence directorate as 
part of its organizational structure until now and is in the process of defining its 
role.  The NGB Intelligence officer serves as the advisor on intelligence issues for 
the Chief of NGB, the deputy Chief, and the Adjutants General and is currently 
working towards developing a “common operating system”44 for all users to meet 
its goal of increasing intelligence sharing between the NG in each state, 
NORTHCOM, NGB and DOD.45 
  
C. EVALUATION OF NG RESPONSE AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
 
Recent initiatives have done a very good job of defining the consequence 
management role for the National Guard within homeland security efforts, 
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effectively leveraging the National Guard’s longstanding capabilities for 
responding to natural disasters and WMD attacks.  This effort includes the 
development of NG Reaction Forces designed to provide a swift response to a 
terrorist attack.  However, much less attention has been paid to the potential role 
the National Guard might play in the prevention of terrorist attacks through critical 
infrastructure protection, intelligence analysis, and interagency coordination for 
law enforcement.  In part, this is because NORTHCOM’s mission of prevention 
has not yet been clearly defined.  But as NORTHCOM and actors at the state 
level work to define their responsibilities on this front, the need for NG support to 
these efforts will become clearer.   
 
1. Consequence Management 
 
National Guard Reaction Forces need to be ready to respond quickly to 
local, state, and federal requests for support.  The National Guard is in the 
process of deciding what forces will make up the NG Reaction Forces.  The 
personnel in each state need to be trained to conduct a wide variety of missions 
including the following:  securing military forces including the WMD-CSTs, 
managing riots, protecting DOD installations, personnel, and equipment, 
establishing security check stations, and displaying military force.46 
 
2. Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 
The FSIVA mission provides for intelligence analysis and vulnerability 
assessment and therefore is a notable exception to the otherwise overwhelming 
emphasis on consequence management in the NG’s role.  This is a particularly 
important role especially since the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense, Paul McHale, recently noted in April 2004, during a hearing before the 
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House Government Reform Committee, it looks favorable for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection to become a core mission for the National Guard.47  The 
National Guard is keenly aware of the vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure 
within their state and many Adjutant Generals serve in a dual role as their state 
Emergency Manager.48 
The FSIVA teams need to be trained to conduct vulnerability assessments 
of critical infrastructure at the state and federal levels.  Their state mission is to 
“Provide a full spectrum of vulnerability assessments on critical industrial, 
economic, and protective infrastructure within the state.”49  Their federal mission 
is to “Provide Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments of DOD facilities 
(JSIVA) and assessments of the Defense Industrial Base.”50  The National Guard 
is in the process of deciding what forces will make up the FSIVA teams.  
Members require intelligence analysis to conduct their mission and they need 
training skills to teach protection measures to civilian organizations.  The size of 
the team being proposed may be insufficient given the massive responsibilities of 
the teams to include conducting vulnerability assessments, teaching 
organizations about protection measures, devising crisis response plans and 
presumably carrying out exercises to prepare for such a scenario.   
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3. Intelligence Analysis 
 
The intelligence role for the National Guard is largely undefined.  National 
Guard personnel should participate in state intelligence fusion centers assisting 
with intelligence analysis and passing critical intelligence and “intelligence-based 
risk analysis”51 to the new NG intelligence staff as well as NORTHCOM, NGB, 
and DOD.  The central mission of the National Guard is to support the states.  
National Guard participation is required in state intelligence fusion centers 
because intelligence capacity at the state level is least developed in contrast to 
the federal level and there needs to be a bridge between LEA and national 
security intelligence community.  The National Guard is perfectly situated for this 
role since it can accomplish the mission respecting existing laws. 
Major General Tim Lowenberg testified regarding the capabilities of the 
National Guard on April 29, 2004 before the House Government Reform 
Committee.  He wears various hats in HLS, serving as the Adjutant General for 
the state of Washington, the Chair of Homeland Security for the Adjutants 
General Association of the United States, the Washington Emergency 
Management Official and a member of the Defense Science Board Summer 
Study on DOD Roles and Missions in HLS.  General Lowenberg highlights in his 
testimony that military personnel are often the only people that have security 
clearances and the equipment capable of transmitting secure information, which 
makes the NG uniquely qualified to deal with secure information and 
intelligence.52  He also advocates involving the National Guard in state 
intelligence fusion efforts: 
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If the National Guard were more directly involved in the intelligence 
analysis centers in each state, Governors would be able to make 
more  informed decisions about their state’s homeland security 
risks and countermeasures.53   
 
4. Interagency Coordination for Law Enforcement 
 
Northern Command has identified a required capability for interagency 
coordination in order to “Coordinate and synchronize NORTHCOM activities with 
International, national, DOD, and non-DOD departments and agencies to ensure 
mutual understanding and unity of effort.”54 One of NORTHCOM’s enabling 
capabilities to assist with interagency coordination is to embed DOD resources 
within the response plans of civilian agencies, which would provide a faster, more 
synergistic response to a terrorist attack.55 The National Guard has created a 
capability that responds to NORTHCOM’s need for interagency coordination for 
Consequence Management with its WMD-CST’s.  These teams have started to 
become embedded in the plans of various first responders.  However, except for 
counterdrug issues, the NG does not currently provide for interagency 
coordination with law enforcement agencies.  
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III. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF CD ASSETS WITHIN THE NG 
HLS MISSION 
 
In every case I can think of at this moment, the actual work done by 
soldiers supporting the war on drugs would be virtually identical to 
the work required in the war on terror.56 
⎯National Guard State Counterdrug Coordinator, “Integration of 
the NG Counterdrug and Homeland Security Programs” 
 
This chapter will illustrate how CD units might be used by the National 
Guard in support of civilian authorities engaged in homeland security.  A highly 
skilled, equipped, and responsive full-time force that is adaptable to the needs of 
the governor and the Adjutant General already exists in every state.  National 
Guard CD units currently perform duties that contribute to protecting the security 
of the United States.  The first section of this chapter will present a 
comprehensive analysis of this issue, matching CD capabilities up to HLS 
requirements in the following areas:  legal authority and regulatory guidance, 
personnel, equipment, training, and missions.  Then proposals from other NG CD 
Coordinators for potential components of CD-HLS integrated programs will be 
presented.  Finally, a case study of an established CD-HLS integrated program in 
West Virginia will be examined. 
 
A. COMPARISON OF CD CAPABILITIES AND HLS REQUIREMENTS  
 
In 1989, Congress created the National Guard Counterdrug Support 
Program in the National Defense Authorization Act and directed the National 
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Guard to provide counterdrug support to local, state, and Federal law 
enforcement agencies.  Congress provided 40 million dollars to states that had 
submitted and received approval for their Governor’s State Plans, which outlined 
how full-time National Guard personnel in their state will be utilized to support 
drug Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA’s)57 and Community Based Organizations. 
Each state developed a unique plan based on the needs of the state and the 
needs of local, state, and federal drug LEA’s and submitted it to National Guard 
Bureau for review.  Every year since its inception, the Counterdrug Support 
Program has received annual appropriations from Congress to fund personnel 
and equipment.   
Today, the National Guard has Governor State Plans for conducting 
counterdrug activities in all 54 states and territories.  Army and Air National 
Guard soldiers and airmen in every state help protect our country from the flow of 
illegal drugs into and within the U.S. The National Guard provides counterdrug 
support in two major areas:  assisting law enforcement to stop the flow of drugs 
and assisting community based organizations to reduce the demand for drugs.  
There are six mission categories and eighteen missions authorized by the 
Secretary of Defense for the NG CD Support Program, as shown in Figure 3.1.58   
The NG in each state is under the control of the governor, when in Title 32 
status, and “provides a non-hierarchal, legal, and rapid employment capability.”59  
The Joint Force Headquarters in every state has vast experience working with 
outside agencies during domestic emergencies.  The NG CD program is 
individually tailored and provides additional capability to the state headquarters in 
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order to meet the needs of each state in the war on drugs.60  If CD assets are 
made dual-use for HLS then existing resources will be leveraged to provide 



















Figure 3.1 NG CD Missions (From JP 3-07.4, Joint CD Opns, III-32) 
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1. Legal Authority and Regulatory Guidance 
 
National Guard personnel are ideally suited to perform HLS missions in 
Title 32 status for two reasons:  the Posse Comitatus Act is not a restriction and 
public concerns will be eased.  First, Title 18, Section 1385 of the US Code is the 
Posse Comitatus Act, which states “Whoever, except in cases and under 
circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, 
willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or 
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than two years, or both.”61  This is act is designed to prevent federal 
soldiers from becoming a civilian police force62 and prohibits federal forces, 
operating in a Title 10 status, from performing law enforcement duties. In 
contrast, National Guard forces, operating in a Title 32 status, are exempt from 
Posse Comitatus.  It is however important to note that DOD policy prevents the 
NG from “arresting suspects, conducting searches, or becoming involved in the 
chain of custody of evidence.”63   
National Guard CD personnel are particularly appropriate for HLS 
missions because they are trained and experienced in handling civil disturbances 
and following rules of engagement.64  These rules are designed to ensure the 
safety of civilians.  National Guard CD personnel also have more experience 
than other NG forces in working with law enforcement agencies legally.  A survey 
respondent indicates “Many states have established legislation and controls to 
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allow NG CD personnel to support law enforcement, so it's not that big of a "legal 
leap" to support the LEA in HD.  Law enforcement is law enforcement.”65  
The National Guard has appropriate regulations for supporting law 
enforcement operations and CD personnel are accustomed to performing 
according to these rules.  National Guard Regulation 500-2 (Air National Guard 
Instruction 10-801), titled National Guard Counterdrug Support, is the primary 
regulatory document for the NG CD support program providing detailed policy 
and implementing guidance, including types of missions, considerations for 
funding, training, equipment and personnel, legal issues, reporting requirements, 
and a description of the Governor’s State Plan Process.66  The regulation can be 
easily amended to include duties associated with CD-HLS integration.  Chapter 
Seven of Army Field Manual 100-19, titled Domestic Support Operations outlines 
planning considerations for operations in support of law enforcement agencies 
including details on the Army CD Support Program and considerations for 
combating terrorism.67   
There are restrictions applied to the military on intelligence gathering 
domestically.  These restrictions include “collecting, retaining, or disseminating 
information about the domestic activities of US citizens”68 in accordance with 
Executive Order 12333.  The FBI has been charged with this task.  However, if a 
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member of the military happens to run across anything suspicious in the course 
of performing their job then it is acceptable, and even expected, for them to pass 
the information to law enforcement.69  There are two intelligence oversight 
documents that must be adhered to, which are DOD Directive 5240.1-R, 
Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect 
United States Citizens and Army Regulation 381-10, US Army Intelligence 
Activities.  DOD Directive 5240.1-R states National Guard personnel can only 
collect information if it is part of its mission.70  Army Regulation 381-10 reiterates 
this limitation on the collection of information and states NG personnel can only 
retain information if it has been lawfully collected and disseminate information if 
there is a ‘need to know’.71  National Guard CD intelligence analysts are used to 
operating according to these restrictions.  They follow the rules while performing 
their current mission assisting counterdrug efforts. 
 
2. Personnel  
 
The National Guard Counterdrug Support Program has a full-time Title 32 
organizational structure already in place. The National Guard does not own drug 
units on a manning document such as a Modification Table of Organization 
(MTOE) or Table of Distribution (TDA).  Instead, the National Guard uses existing 
Army and Air National Guard manpower within the state to fulfill requirements.  
Personnel in the counterdrug program do not count against the authorized 
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endstrength for the reserve components.72  People are selected for the program 
based on their military skills or civilian expertise.  The structure varies by state 
based on the drug threat and the governor’s state plan. 
The NG CD Support Program has been operational in local communities 
in every state and territory for the past fifteen years and its personnel have 
developed solid relationships, established trust, and increased communication 
with state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies and community based 
organizations, such as local police task forces, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, U. S. Border Patrol, and U.S. Marshals.  Counterdrug 
personnel perform duties in rural and urban areas as well as on U.S. borders.  
Intelligence Analysts within the counterdrug program already have necessary 
personnel security clearances and they have been trained on the law 
enforcement agency databases.  On the survey responses, CD Coordinators 
indicated due to the established relationships in all of these communities, CD and 
HLS are “a natural partnership.”73   
There are three additional characteristics of NG CD personnel that are a 
significant advantage for a HLS force.  First, making CD personnel and 
equipment dual-use for CD and HLS support to law enforcement agencies is cost 
effective.  During this period of constrained resources, making resources dual-
use is a great advantage.  Second, notwithstanding funding limitations and 
deployments, there is little personnel turnover of CD soldiers unlike their Active 
Duty counterparts who frequently make Permanent Change of Station (PCS) 
moves.74  Third, the NG CD Support Program provides an established and 
successful command and control structure for each state.  It is under the control 
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of the Adjutant General and Governor.  The organizational structure provides 
great flexibility to the Governor who can then adapt the program with specialized 
personnel, training, and equipment.  This flexibility makes the CD structure ideal 




The Counterdrug Congressional statute authorizes the National Guard to 
obtain unique equipment to support law enforcement agencies with counterdrug 
operations.75  A similar approach can be used for HLS if Title 32, Section 112 of 
US Code is amended to include HLS activities.  The specialized equipment that 
CD units already own, which is applicable to homeland security includes C-26 
fixed wing aircraft, OH-58 helicopters, Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), Mobile 
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (MVACIS) and Ion Scanners.76  
The CD aircraft conduct missions that total over 40,000 flight hours 
annually.77  Eleven C-26 aircraft are equipped with Forward Looking Infra-Red 
(FLIR) and video technology, which can be used to assist in conducting 
surveillance of vehicles, aerial transport of agents, and command and control.78  
A total of 116 Reconnaissance and Aerial Interdiction Detachment (RAID) OH-58 
helicopters are in the CD program and are equipped with FLIR, searchlights, and 
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video technology, which can be used to assist law enforcement in conducting 
surveillance and tracking activities.79  
Counterdrug resources also consist of twelve LAVs, capable of carrying 8 
to 12 people and transporting them into hazardous environments (except 
chemical) to assist Law Enforcement Agencies in maneuvering around harmful 
areas and to assist with command and control.80  Two MVACIS assist in 
searching vehicles for concealed drugs, arms, or explosives in California and 
New York.81  In addition, Ion Scanners are used when looking for prohibited 
goods or explosives.82  Counterdrug personnel receive training on all of the 




Countedrug personnel are trained on a Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS)/Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) and some also possess valuable civilian 
work experience.83  A significant advantage of the organizational structure of the 
counterdrug program is that its personnel still train for their wartime mission with 
their unit on the newest military equipment.  Just like the rest of the National 
Guard, counterdrug personnel train for their wartime mission as a reserve of the 
Active Components during weekend Inactive Duty Training/Inactive Duty and 
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summer Annual Training.84  However, counterdrug personnel also receive 
specialized counterdrug training during the week enhancing their military skills 
even more.85  Other National Guard units only train 39 days a year.  Therefore, 
counterdrug personnel maintain a greater military proficiency than part time (M-
Day) personnel, by practicing their skills full-time.86   
A study was conducted by the Science Applications International 
Corporation to determine the combat readiness of NG Counterdrug personnel. 
On April 3, 2001, a report was submitted to NGB that included the following 
conclusion:   
By having the opportunity to attend additional and more varied 
training, CD participants, in many cases, are better trained than 
non-CD participants.  This training, while mainly CD related is 
valuable and is often applicable to military duties. . .Based on these 
facts it can be seen that most CD participants experience an 
increase individual readiness to some degree due to the CD 
sponsored training they attend.87 
A CD Coordinator indicated on the survey:  
There are crossover areas in NG-CD and Homeland Defense (HD).  
Many of the skill sets for drug interdiction and terrorist interdiction 
missions are the same.88 
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B. PROPOSALS FOR POTENTIAL CD SUPPORT TO HLS 
 
There are many NG missions, conducted by CD personnel, which are 
clearly relevant to DOD’s role of Military Support to Civil Authorities for homeland 
security.  The personnel in the CD program are well suited for defending the 
United States against terrorism because they have been trained to work with 
other agencies.  The NG CD personnel have been integrated with local, state, 
and federal agencies since 1989 so relationships have been established.  Since 
there are NG CD officers working in various agencies already, the NG Joint 
Force Headquarters can coordinate with them directly enhancing 




Training is an area that many states would like to be involved with.  
Several states proposed allowing the counterdrug schools across the United 
States to teach courses to law enforcement agencies involved in counter-
terrorism as well as counterdrug activities.89  The National Guard CD program’s 
well-established network of schools, which provides strategic, operational, and 
tactical training for NG personnel and state and local law enforcement agencies, 
could be easily adapted to provide training in support of homeland security 
missions.  Five schools have been created across the country to teach tactical 
counterdrug courses.  The schools are as follows:  The Regional Counterdrug 
Training Academy (RCTA) in Meridian NAS, Meridian MS, the Multijurisdictional 
Counterdrug Task Force Training (MCTFT) in St Petersburg, Florida, the 
Northeast Counterdrug Training Center (NCTC) in Ft. Indiantown Gap, 
Pennsylvania, the Western Regional Counterdrug Training Center (WRCT) in 
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San Luis Obispo, California, and the Midwest Counterdrug Training Center 
(MCTC) in Camp Dodge, Johnston, Iowa.90  These courses are taught free of 
charge to law enforcement personnel as well as community-based organizations 
and military personnel.   
National Guard Bureau estimates that seventy-five percent of courses 
taught at NG CD schools are also relevant to counterterrorism operations.91  The 
training varies at each school but some examples are classes on surveillance 
operations, investigative techniques, languages, and terrorist threats.92  One 
state proposed that this if the CD schools were integrated into HLS, training 
could include instruction on “tactics, techniques and procedures used to 
successfully operate a tactical insertion team on the borders and urban areas.”93   
 
2. Air and Ground Transportation 
 
The New Jersey CD Support Program provides a good example of how 
National Guard CD assets can provide air and ground transportation and 
interagency coordination in support of the homeland security effort.  The New 
Jersey CD Coordinator, Major John Sheard describes below a program where NJ 
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CD personnel help law enforcement agencies develop an execution plan to use 
CD aviation assets.94  
For interagency coordination, New Jersey CD is a lead agency in a 
supporting role.  We coordinate air transportation assets from one 
agency to another bringing interoperability and uniqueness of the 
National Guard.95 
  The agencies assisted by NJ CD include:  FBI, DEA, US Postal Service, 
NJ State Police, and Department of Criminal Justice.  Sheard also points out 
New Jersey CD personnel trained for this emergency support mission and 
executed it on September 11th, 2001 transporting first responders, by air, to 
ground zero when traffic on the ground was in gridlock.96  Due to their lack of 
aviation assets, the Police in some states, such as New Jersey have a need for 
NG CD aviation capabilities.   
Sheard states many reasons supporting New Jersey’s air transportation 
mission:  New Jersey CD pilots typically fly 750 hours annually so they are very 
familiar with the airspace, which increases the likelihood for a successful 
operation; the uniqueness of NJ CD aviation is that they can launch aircraft 
quickly; an aircraft can be on station in less than three hours at night, usually 20 
minutes during the day and anywhere in the state within one hour; one aircraft is 
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3. Air and Ground Reconnaissance 
 
The NG CD mission of Aerial and Surface Reconnaissance, as defined by 
NGR 500-2, consists of conducting observation by air, ground or water to spot 
illegal drug operations.98  Aerial and surface reconnaissance is useful to both CD 
and HLS activities because this mission assists law enforcement with increasing 
situational awareness and targeting a suspected area.  The California National 
Guard Counterdrug unit provides a good example to illustrate the 
reconnaissance mission.  The C-26 aircraft and the OH-58 helicopter have 
special equipment to enhance night operations.  In addition, the OH-58 has video 
equipment, which can record suspicious activities and the C-26 can take 
photographs, which can then be analyzed by interpreters and used by law 
enforcement in future operations.99  The surface reconnaissance teams are 
trained in US Army Infantry skills, making them capable of surviving for extended 
periods and maneuvering in different types of terrain.100  The teams conduct 
mobile patrols and man observation posts with special equipment, allowing them 
to operate at night, communicate with LEA’s, and photograph suspicious 
activities.101   
Some states provided specific examples of air and ground reconnaissance 
support to HLS.  One state recommends “Special Operations support from 
specially equipped OH-58 helicopters, C-26 aircraft, and trained ground recon 
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teams.”102  Other proposals include ground surveillance and air observation and 
reconnaissance (fixed and rotor wing) focusing on security of Mexican and 
Canadian borders including use of photograph interpretation and imagery.103   
 
4. Border Support 
 
National Guard CD personnel are also assisting with cargo and mail 
inspections at the borders.  They use MVACIS scans at Ports of Entry for 
vehicles and ion scans for explosives.104  In addition, National Guard CD Canine 
Teams provide assistance with inspections by sniffing for bombs.105  National 
Guard CD assistance with cargo and mail inspections can easily serve a dual-
use capability of providing homeland security support by looking for drugs and 
terrorists simultaneously.  However the Department of Defense is phasing the 
National Guard out of this mission by the end of Fiscal Year 2004. 
 
5. Intelligence Analysis 
 
National Guard CD units have trained and experienced intelligence 
analysts that can be used for HLS.  The mission of Investigative Case and 
Analyst Support is focused on intelligence and information analysis.  Specifically 
under this mission, NG CD members develop intelligence databases and assist 
law enforcement with analyzing intelligence and helping with investigations such 
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as “inputting, reviewing, and analyzing collected LEA information, and providing 
legal, paralegal, and auditing assistance.”106  The same duties performed by CD 
intelligence analysts can also support HLS.   
Counterdrug intelligence analysts are able to support counterterrorism 
efforts due to the link between drug trafficking and terrorism in the United States.  
This link has become more evident in recent years and can be shown in two 
different ways.  First and foremost, terrorists can enter the country using the 
same routes that have been used by criminals to smuggle drugs and 
weapons.107  While conducting normal duties analyzing intelligence for drug 
investigations, NG CD personnel are apt to run across information containing 
suspicious activities that may involve terrorists.           
 Second, illegal drug trafficking finances many terrorist activities.  There is 
a small percentage of drugs sold in the US that support terrorism with a global 
reach.  The DEA Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, Steven Casteel, points 
out evidence of narcoterrorism in the United States on September 9, 2001 when 
Columbia distributed and then DEA “seized 53 kilo[gram]s of Afghan heroin in 
New York.”108  Raphael Perl, a Congressional Research Service Senior Policy 
Analyst for international terrorism and narcotics issues, states the following:  “. . . 
money from the drug trade is increasingly important for terrorists, because state 
sponsorship is on the wane.109   Perl also states “. . .the U.S. homeland is now 
the preferred target, not only for drug traffickers, but also for terrorists.”110   
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The Department of Defense has already acknowledged the link between 
drug trafficking and terrorism and responded by issuing DOD Counternarcotics 
policy guidance supporting programs that aid the war on terrorism.111  As 
evidence of this new policy, the mission statement for the Joint Task Force Six 
(JTF-6) was recently amended.  This counterdrug task force is a federal 
organization that is part of U. S. Northern Command.  Its mission before 
September 11, 2001 was as follows:  “JTF-6 synchronizes and integrates 
Department of Defense operational, training and intelligence support to domestic 
law enforcement agency counter-drug efforts in the continental U. S. to reduce 
the availability of illegal drugs in the United States.”112  After the 9/11 attack, the 
JTF-6 mission had the following statement added to its mission:  “and when so 
directed, provides operational, training, and intelligence support to domestic 
agencies’ efforts in combating terrorism.”113  It would seem logical that if the 
connection has already been made for CD task forces at the federal level, then 
the same amendment should be made for the NG CD units at the state level.   
Some states have their intelligence officers attend terrorism intelligence 
meetings with organizations such as the FBI.114  One state even has the NG CD 
support program serving “as the executive agent for hiring, placing and 
supervising intel HLS intel analysts.”115  Major General Lowenberg recommends 
that CD personnel should be a participant on the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 
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and the Joint Analytical Center in each state.116  As state authorities continue to 
develop their HLS plans, it is likely they will turn to the NG for support in a wider 
variety of areas than is currently envisioned by NORTHCOM or NGB.   
The lack of intelligence analysts being devoted to HLS is damaging our 
efforts to prevent the next terrorist attack.  During a time of constrained 
resources, DOD needs to do more with less and leverage all of its existing 
resources, including those of the NG, in the war against terrorism.   
 
6. Linguist Support 
 
New Jersey provides language translation for CD investigations.  
However, Sheard indicates that New Jersey CD personnel could potentially 
provide linguist support to the homeland defense effort.117  Since the war on 
terror involves many different countries that speak various languages, there is a 
growing need for language translation capabilities.  Advantages of the NG CD 
linguists are as follows:  CD personnel can transcribe tapes that have been 
obtained by a court order (Title three investigation) and a hard copy transcript 
can be produced to meet court requirements, if necessary.118  The requirement 
for the New Jersey National Guard is that there is at least a 3 second delay prior 
to NG personnel having access to the tape to be transcribed.119  
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7. Interagency Coordination 
  
A successful response to a terrorist incident, such as the one that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, requires strong relationships and an integrated 
effort from a variety of federal, state, and local agencies.120  The CD mission of 
coordination, liaison, and management is primarily geared toward interagency 
coordination.  Specifically, under this mission, NG CD members conduct mission 
planning and coordination of people and equipment and serve as a liaison with 
law enforcement agencies and community based agencies.121  The NG CD units 
have established relationships with LEA’s that can directly contribute to 
interagency coordination in support of HLS.   
The significance of interagency coordination is highlighted in the article 
titled Lessons of the “War” on Drugs for the “War” on Terrorism.  In this article, 
Caulkins, Kleiman, and Reuter state “Counterdrug and counterterror efforts alike 
transcend jurisdictional and organizational boundaries, which makes coordination 
and organization of efforts important to their overall success.”122   
After the horrific terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, Major 
General Philip Oates, the Adjutant General of Alaska and the Governor of 
Alaska’s representative for Homeland Security, provided input to a Report titled 
Recommendations for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Planning A Year 
After 9-11 for the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness of the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government.  In this report, Oates recommends the NG CD 
Support Program serve as an “apt model for a small full-time organization that 
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could significantly improve interagency capabilities for homeland security.”123  A 
CD Coordinator recommends the following:   
The Counterdrug Coordinator must be very proactive and engaged 
with the various agencies.  Very effective in those areas where the 
CDC has well integrated his assets in the law enforcement 
community.124  
In accordance with a Governor’s State Plan, National Guard personnel 
and equipment could provide daily support to federal law enforcement agencies 
that are assisting in the fight against terrorism, such as FEMA, FBI,125 and DEA.  
In addition, National Guard resources could assist state and local agencies such 
as the State Police, U. S. Attorney’s Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council, US Postal 
Service, and Department of Criminal Justice.  National Guard CD personnel have 
extensive experience in coordinating operations with other agencies and can 
assist law enforcement agencies as a liaison officer.  In this capacity, they can 
help LEA’s plan, exercise, and execute operations. By assisting LEA’s with HLS 
operations, NG CD personnel can increase situational awareness for the NG 
Joint Force Headquarters at the state level, the headquarters at National Guard 
Bureau, and NORTHCOM to assist with prevention efforts.  According to a 
survey respondent,  
I believe the most obvious opportunity is interagency coordination.  
We have an established net work in place and already have the 
respect of all of the LEA’s [with which] we work.126 
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C. WEST VIRGINIA CASE STUDY 
 
The West Virginia CD Support Program provides a good example of how 
National Guard CD assets can provide support to the homeland security and 
homeland defense effort.  It is a comprehensive program that covers many 
important areas, such as intelligence analysis, communications, critical 
infrastructure protection, language translation, training, support at national 
security events, and dual-use capabilities for HLS and the overseas warfight.  It 
is important because it was a plan devised by the Adjutant General at the request 
of the State Governor.  Since many governors have called on their Adjutant 
Generals to head HLS programs, it is likely that they will come up with programs 
similar to those developed in West Virginia.  The West Virginia National Guard 
has been involved in homeland defense activities since 1997.127  
The Adjutant General had the vision to develop a homeland 
defense program back then.  We now have a framework to operate 
from.128  
 Developing a robust HLS and HD program was important to West Virginia 
for several reasons.  According to LTC James Hoyer, Counterdrug Coordinator 
for West Virginia, the state is a potential terrorist target and staging area because 
it is a drug shipment and distribution center and it is one of four major chemical 
manufacturing centers.129  Also, LTC Hoyer notes “West Virginia is located within 
an eight hour drive of 70 percent of the east coast.”130   
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On September 11, 2001, the Adjutant General of the West Virginia 
National Guard, Major General Allen E. Tackett tasked soldiers from the CD 
Support Program to participate in an ad hoc Intelligence Fusion Center managed 
by the State Police and the U. S. Attorney’s Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council.131  
Other representatives of the Intelligence Fusion Center include Drug 
Enforcement Administration and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force.  National 
Guard Counterdrug Intelligence Analysts began expanding the information that 
they tracked.132  This decision marked a groundbreaking direction for the WV CD 
program.  Before September 11th, the focus was on tracking drug trafficking 
information.  When they moved to the intelligence fusion center, the CD 
Intelligence Analysts incorporated suspicious activity reports as part of their 
duties.  For the first time in West Virginia, drug threat and terrorist threat tracking 
are combined.133  The Intelligence Fusion Center has operated continuously 
since September 11th and has evolved into a formal facility.134     
West Virginia wanted to train its personnel to a high standard so they 
chose to work with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which is one 
of the leading agencies in the field.  When conducting threat and vulnerability 
assessments for homeland security, the NG CD intelligence analysts use the 
Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model developed from DTRA 
training and support.135  All of the agencies that are participating in the 












intelligence fusion center provide information that is entered into Geographical 
Information System (GIS) software.136  GIS is a digital mapping program that 
combines many different pieces of information from different databases to 
graphically display the information you need.  Specifically, analysts use GIS to 
assist in comparing drug and terrorist tracking information with critical 
infrastructure sites in West Virginia to determine if there are any patterns.137  
 
2. Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 
The CD ground reconnaissance teams in West Virginia have been cross-
trained by DTRA to perform threat and vulnerability assessments as well as 
training for terrorism awareness and on “. .  .countermeasures and random anti-
terrorism measure as part of a prevention and deterrence (anti-terrorism program 




West Virginia is the ideal state for an integrated CD-HLS program 
because of its robust training programs and facilities.  The WV NG has 
established terrorist awareness programs and provides instruction to critical 
infrastructure sites within the state.139  This training consists of defining terrorism 
and identifying potential indicators people are likely to see prior to an event.140  











West Virginia is focused on prevention of terrorist attacks.  According to DTRA, 
ninety percent of the terrorist event cycle is surveillance or planning to carry out 
the attack.141  He adds “If you learn how to spot threat indicators and you have 
an intelligence fusion center in place with the ability to dispatch law enforcement, 
then there is a greater chance for prevention.”142   
Training in West Virginia also consists of providing instruction on random 
anti-terrorism countermeasures and conducting vehicle inspections for the 
various CIP sites located throughout the state.143  West Virginia has a regional 
training institute at Camp Dawson with the capability to train military and civilian 
organizations on homeland security. The state also has a tunnel complex, which 
has training ranges including a subway, a highway tunnel scenario, and a post-
blast rubble scenario.  LTC Hoyer highlights that the Memorial Tunnel is an ideal 
location to train on how to go through rubble after a building collapse and how to 
operate in a confined space.144   
 
4. Support at National Security Events 
 
West Virginia shares its resources out of state.  Currently its ground 
reconnaissance teams are supporting NORTHCOM on three national security 
special events.145  Also, the West Virginia CD C-26 is scheduled to be used in 












Georgia to assist with communications support and command and control 
assistance during the upcoming G-8 summit.146 
 
5. Capabilities for HLS and Overseas Warfight 
 
Major General Tackett’s focus is on developing dual-use capabilities and 
facilities to support agencies by providing for homeland defense of the United 
States and providing support to combatant commanders in other theaters.147  Not 
only is it important to build capabilities for HLS, but NG forces must also maintain 
relevancy for the overseas warfight.  LTC Hoyer explains the dual-use capability 
by the following example.  WV National Guard CD personnel can conduct 
vulnerability assessments within CONUS by supporting NORTHCOM and the 
states.148  In addition, since the WV NG is trained and certified to the DTRA 
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
We could assume HS missions today with appropriate funding and 
lifting of legal restrictions.150 
⎯National Guard State Counterdrug Coordinator, “Integration of 
the NG Counterdrug and Homeland Security Programs” 
 
 Authorizing NG CD forces to perform HLS duties will provide the NG with 
an experienced HLS force that is able to respond quickly and efficiently.  NG CD 
capabilities, which are currently called upon only to play a role in consequence 
management, can be more fully leveraged if given the mission to prevent future 
terrorist attacks.  This chapter presents a proposal for an integrated CD-HLS 
program, which includes a description of the program and a comparison of 
alternatives.  In addition, the challenges of integrating CD into HLS are described 
and solutions are recommended.  
 
A. PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATED CD-HLS PROGRAM  
 
The proposal for an integrated program is as follows:  First, make National 
Guard Counterdrug personnel dual-use for HLS.  Second, although it will vary by 
state, add some HLS missions to the existing NG CD Support Program.  Third, 
have some dedicated HLS personnel outside of (and above) the dual tasked CD 
unit in order for the National Guard to perform the HLS activities of the CD unit, 
the WMD-CSTs, the Rapid Reaction Force and the FSIVA team.  In this way, the 
Governor will have the flexibility to use all of the NG assets within his state as 
needed, based on the current terrorist threat level and the drug situation.  This is 
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an ideal solution because some states need more focus on HLS while others 
need to maintain a robust counterdrug program.  There will always be a core NG 
element to respond to HLS efforts, including prevention.  Each Governor would 
develop a unique CD-HLS State Plan with the law enforcement and community 
based organizations within the state as well as appropriate federal LEA’s, such 
as the FBI.  The integrated state plans process would be identical to the CD 
State Plans process in existence today, where the plans are forwarded to 
National Guard Bureau for review and the Department of Defense for approval.  
 
1. HLS Missions for CD Units  
 
National Guard Counterdrug personnel and equipment can be applied to 
the HLS mission in many ways.  There are two NG Force Capability Packages 
designed to respond to HLS needs where CD assets can contribute.  First, CD 
can make up part of a NG Reaction Force.  The Chief of National Guard Bureau 
asked all states to develop a NG Reaction Force (NGB Info Paper) capable of 
quickly assisting local, state, and Federal agencies in response to an incident.  
The requirement for the NG Reaction Force is a small company-size initial 
response within four hours and a follow-on Battalion-minus size response within 
four to twenty-four hours (citation).  One CD Coordinator responded that their 
state’s CD assets will provide the initial response capability within 72 hours.151  In 
some states, National Guard CD assets can respond to an incident quickly 
providing the first military response while the state activates additional NG forces 
as the follow-on or sustainment part of the reaction force.152  However, other 
states don’t have enough CD personnel to meet this requirement.  New Jersey 
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has a plan for a reaction force but the CD force is not large enough.153  A 
company, required for the initial rapid response varies by state but is usually a 
force of approximately 100-150 people.  In contrast, an average CD unit has only 
about 30 members.154 
Second, CD units can assist with the Full Spectrum Integrated 
Vulnerability Assessment (FSIVA).  Before personnel are deployed to guard 
critical infrastructure, assessments of key assets in each state need to be 
conducted to determine vulnerabilities and if necessary, develop a plan to reduce 
the vulnerability.  National Guard CD personnel are a logical choice for this 
mission because they not only have vast experience in planning and coordinating 
operations with civilian agencies, but also have the intelligence and 
reconnaissance personnel necessary for developing the threat assessment.  
Twelve CD personnel make up the entire FSIVA prototype team in WV and they 
are all trained to both the FSIVA and DTRA standard so there can be a dual use 
capability.155 In West Virginia, National Guard Bureau reimburses the CD 
account for the cost of training and conducting the FSIVA mission.156 
National Guard CD units can assist with interagency coordination, 
intelligence analysis, and air and ground reconnaissance.  For interagency 
coordination, NG CD personnel already work on a daily basis in many state law 
enforcement agencies to coordinate CD activities.  Their mission could easily be 
expanded to include liaison duties such as assisting LEA’s with planning and 
exercising HLS operations, providing communications support, and most 
importantly, increasing situational awareness of NG activities for the state Joint 
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Force Headquarters, the National Guard Bureau, and Northern Command.  In 
addition, a unique capability of the National Guard is its valuable contribution to 
intelligence analysis.  Counterdrug personnel have trained intelligence analysts 
that could expand their responsibilities to include conducting analysis of both CD 
and HLS intelligence.  National Guard CD units are highly qualified to make this 
contribution due to their strong relationships with local law enforcement agencies 
and past experience with analyzing information in the Counterdrug effort.  Finally, 
NG CD personnel have extensive training and specialized equipment for 
conducting observation missions, from the ground and air, of a specific area or 
target.  Right now the target is solely on personnel conducting illegal drug 
activities but it is feasible to expand the target to include terrorist activities as 
well.    
There are additional missions where NG CD personnel and equipment 
can provide HLS support.  National Guard CD schools can be used to teach 
LEA’s involved in Counterterrorism activities.  Air and Ground CD assets can be 
used to transport first responders to an incident.  Counterdrug personnel can 
assist with border security by providing cargo/mail inspection where they search 
for drugs and terrorists simultaneously.  Linguists can provide language 
translation.  West Virginia provides an example of a comprehensive CD-HLS 
integrated program where CD intelligence analysts track suspicious activities in 
addition to drug trafficking and CD ground reconnaissance teams have been 
cross-trained to conduct vulnerability assessments for critical infrastructure.  
There are a wide variety of CD capabilities that can be applied to HLS.  The 
actual CD-HLS dual tasking for each state will vary depending on the individual 
state needs.   
 
2. Rationale for an Integrated CD-HLS Program 
 
As stated in Chapter II, the National Guard should conduct the homeland 
security mission in a Title 32 status.  Currently, the only forces that are 
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authorized to perform duties in Title 32 status are the National Guard WMD-
CST’s and the CD units.  One option for an enhanced HLS role for the NG is to 
increase, or even change, the mission of the WMD-CST’s.  However, National 
Guard CD missions and skill sets overlap more with the HLS prevention missions 
that still need to be addressed such as threat assessments by FSIVA teams, 
providing intelligence analysis, and supporting law enforcement.   
Since Posse Comitatus is not a limitation for the entire National Guard, 
another option to enhance HLS is to create a new HLS taskforce based on the 
CD model.  This would entail utilizing a Governor’s State Plan and procuring 
specialized equipment rather than trying to integrate CD and HLS.  In this option, 
NG CD units would remain a separate entity and lend support to the HLS effort 
only when necessary.  For this concept to be implemented, a new full-time force 
structure would have to be created, which would have to be funded, equipped, 
and trained.  During this time of constrained resources and record-level 
deployments overseas, it makes more sense to leverage existing resources for 
the protection of America’s homeland.  National Guard CD units already exist in 
every state and territory.  They are highly trained for missions applicable to HLS 
and have specialized equipment that can contribute to the HLS effort.  The 
personnel are full-time and fall under the control of the Adjutant General 
providing maximum flexibility.  Therefore, making NG CD units dual-use for HLS 
is the only viable option for an enhanced NG HLS role. 
 
B. CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION 
 
There are three challenges involved with CD-HLS integration.  Whenever 
a new program is added, additional funding and personnel will be required.  In 
addition, there is a legal challenge since the law currently requires a drug nexus 




1. Lack of Funding 
 
There are currently two significant funding challenges to creating an 
integrated CD-HLS program.  First, funding for the CD program is not sufficient to 
carry out additional homeland security support activities.  The NG CD Support 
Program currently operates within a flat funding system, receiving a set amount 
of money every year for NG Counterdrug State Plans.  Every time there is a pay 
raise or cost of living increase, the CD program loses people.   
One CD Coordinator estimated that to do both CD and HD missions would 
require “approximately an 80-100% increase in funding.”157 According to another 
CD coordinator,  
When ASD-CN [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-
Narcotics] Mr. Hollis came to our State he indicated that his 
definition of Counterdrug activities includes HLS activities as well.  
He indicated that those states that are actively integrating the two 
would get additional funding.  This did not happen, in fact our 
budget was still reduced by $50k.158 
Second, centralized funding for CD activities may disappear if CD is 
integrated into HLS.  According to John Sheard, it is important to keep funding 
dedicated to the CD mission.159  Sheard points out “Three thousand people died 
in the World Trade Center Attack on September 11th but 15,000 people die 
annually in the drug war.”160  Another CD Coordinator highlights the funding 
dilemma:  “Do I take personnel from their drug missions and move them into HLS 
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type missions in the hopes I may get additional funding to backfill those drug 
missions I have been supporting?”161   
 
2. Lack of Personnel 
 
Integration of CD into HLS would be a smooth transition for the National 
Guard because the types of personnel, equipment and training are routinely the 
same for the CD and the HLS missions.  “After we receive stabilized funding then 
we can expand the amount of personnel, equipment, and training.”162  
Counterdrug Coordinators indicate “Personnel skills can transfer between drug 
nexus and HLS missions easily.”163   
However, survey responses indicate two personnel challenges.  First, 
there may be a requirement for additional personnel from the following specialty 
areas:  intelligence analysis, linguist support, surface/aerial reconnaissance, 
communication, engineering, prevention and deterrence programs such as 
terrorism awareness training, administrative support, supply, pilots, aviation 
mechanics, public affairs, canine handlers, and vulnerability assessment.164  In 
addition, “Linguist support activities require a new list of target languages and 
training in the idiomatic nuances of the terror community.”165 
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Second, another personnel challenge is deployments of CD personnel.  
There are more NG soldiers deployed today than any other time in history.  
According to an April 2004 GAO report, almost half of the personnel in the 
National Guard have been filling new HLS positions to assist in the War on 
Terrorism and to support missions overseas, since September 11.166 Therefore, 
states don’t have time to move in this new direction.   A respondent highlights 
these concerns with the following statement:  “There’s just too much going on 
right now with the mobilization and deployment of the force, as well as ambiguity 
and uncertainty regarding the requirements for Guard support to HD.”167   
Members of NG CD Support Program are Active Duty Special Work 
Counterdrug (ADSW-CD).  They work in NG CD positions full time during the 
week and then on weekends they are part of a wartime unit.  When NG CD 
soldiers are deployed, with their wartime unit, to assist the War on Terrorism, 
there are insufficient people remaining to do the CD mission.168  According to 
New Jersey’s Counterdrug Coordinator, Major John Sheard,  
It takes one year to train CD personnel to support law enforcement.  
After you train the CD personnel to do the HD mission, if they are 
deployed overseas for the warfight, then you lose them.  
Deployments are killing us.  How do you backfill?169   
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3. Legal Restrictions  
 
Many states have not integrated because the legislation establishing the 
National Guard Counterdrug Support Program (Section 112 of US Code Title 32)   
states that NG CD personnel and equipment will be used only “for the purpose of 
drug interdiction and counter-drug activities.”170  Survey responses indicate “The 
only real way to legally integrate CD into HLS is to have a change in our federal 
legislation. . . .”171  According to many CD coordinators, legal restrictions are a 
large factor preventing CD-HLS integration.172  Many non-integrated states 
indicated that they did not pursue the option of integrating CD into HLS because 
of the “fear of improper use of counterdrug funds and personnel.”173 
The National Guard Bureau has provided guidance to the states not to 
integrate CD activities into HLS until the National Guard receives specific 
Congressional authorization for this new direction.  Currently, Congress 
earmarks CD funds for the NG to assist law enforcement agencies in the War on 
Drugs.  A concern expressed by the CD Coordinators is as follows:  If CD is 
integrated into HLS without implementing strict funding controls, then CD funds 
might be “watered down.”174  As one CD Coordinator articulates, the challenge is 
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“how to retain our program, identity, and funding while simultaneously offering 
valuable and unique counterdrug assets to assist homeland security.”175  
 
C. SOLUTIONS TO MEET CHALLENGES  
 
1. Stabilized and Fenced Funding with Cross-Leveling 
 
According to LTC Hoyer, WV has worked around the funding challenge 
well.176  The state receives funding for homeland defense missions and when CD 
assets are used for a HD mission, HD funding reimburses the CD account.177  In 
addition, WV has a separate travel account for HD missions.178  To solve the 
monetary challenge involving CD-HLS integration, funding needs to be stabilized 
for a set number of personnel to allow for promotions and pay increases.  In 
addition, in order to prevent the CD mission from being usurped by HLS 
requirements, CD and HLS each need to receive a fenced amount of funds and 
the ability to cross-level funding from one account to another up to a designated 
threshold.  Whenever CD personnel or equipment are used for HLS, the HLS 
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2. Additional Personnel and Core Staffing 
 
As stated earlier, many of the personnel skills can easily transfer from CD 
to HLS.  When implementing the CD-HLS integration plan, additional personnel 
would need to be hired who will be dual-use.  The following specialty areas may 
be required:  intelligence analysis, linguist support, surface/aerial 
reconnaissance, communication, engineering, prevention and deterrence 
programs such as terrorism awareness training, administrative support, supply, 
pilots, aviation mechanics, public affairs, canine handlers, and vulnerability 
assessment.179  In addition, as stated by LTC Hoyer, to assist with the lack of 
personnel due to deployments, “a certain level of core staffing that is dedicated to 
the homeland defense mission” would need to be established.180  The core 
staffing would need to be composed of some NG CD dual tasked personnel and 
some NG HLS personnel in order to perform the HLS activities of the CD unit, the 
WMD-CSTs, the Rapid Reaction Force and the FSIVA team.  An added benefit 
under the integrated program is that more people will be working the counterdrug 
issue than currently and providing a two-for-one deal since they will be assisting 
with both counterdrug and HLS activities. 
 
3. Congressional Amendment 
 
Congressional modification of Title 32 legislation governing NG activities 
in state status is needed to authorize performance of HLS missions by NG CD 
assets.  According to West Virginia CD Coordinator, LTC James Hoyer, Major 
General Tackett is requesting Congress consider expanding sections 112 and 
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502f of the Title 32 language authorizing homeland defense activities for the 
National Guard with counterdrug as a subset.181  “This would allow the Adjutant 
General to use his National Guard forces and funding as he sees fit since the 
threat level is different in each state.”182  According to John Sheard, the language 
needs to be changed from detect and deter anything harmful to the United States 
for counternarcotics to detect and deter anything harmful to the United States for 
narcoterrorism.183  Counterdrug needs to be part of the homeland defense effort.  
In addition, the Congressional language needs to say the Secretary of Defense 
“shall” fund the program instead of “may.”184 
One respondent suggests “Changing the language from drug nexus to a 
more multi-threat mission encompassing drugs, terrorism, WMD, and other 
unforeseen needs for the future (when the drug nexus was drafted, there was not 
a need to address, at that time, expanding the mission support).”185  Some states 
have sought a more lenient interpretation in the regulatory guidance as an interim 
measure.186   
The good news is that our controlling regulation (NGR500-2) 
provides for exceptions during emergencies.  In those situations we 
can legally use CD assets and then seek proper reimbursement to 
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CD funding streams; this way we do not violate the Purpose Act for 










































                                            




























The connection between international drug operations and 
international terrorism is becoming increasingly well documented.  
The Adjutant Generals Association of the United States therefore 
believes there is an obvious overlap between National Guard 
counter-drug operations and potential Guard counter-terrorism 
operations.  The Defense Science Board’s Volume II report will 
strongly concur with this assessment and with the recommended 
assignment of Guard intelligence analysts to FBI Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTFs), newly formed state and federal intelligence 
fusion centers, and similar operations which fall within the core 
military competencies and DMOSQ and AFSC functions of the 
assigned Guard personnel.  Such integration could also be a 
valuable situational awareness tool for NORTHCOM.  For these 
reasons, the Defense Science Board will recommend in its Volume 
II report that serious consideration be given to transforming the 
National Guard Counter-Drug program into a single, integrated 
National Guard Counter-Drug/Counter-Terrorism program.188 
⎯Major General Tim Lowenberg, Chair of Homeland Security for 
the Adjutants General Association of the United States, 
Transforming the National Guard: Resourcing for Readiness 
 
National Guard CD resources should be made dual-use for HLS activities 
leveraging existing resources to provide a responsive and cost effective HLS 
solution.  If CD personnel are made dual-use and additional missions are added 
to the CD mission, the Governor will have the flexibility of having highly trained 
and equipped soldiers that can be utilized for HLS according to the needs of the 
state and the current threat level.  Given the current level of deployments 
overseas and the likelihood of limited funding, the NG should seek to create dual 
use teams to the extent possible.  This chapter will present a summary of key 
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findings from the case study and survey responses from NG CD Coordinators.  It 
will also include recommendations for CD-HLS integration and considerations for 
future study. 
 
A. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
This thesis is a comprehensive effort towards answering the following 
research question:  How can existing capabilities in the CD Support Program be 
leveraged for use in HLS missions?  What are the implications of this for how a 
NG HLS Support Program should be organized? 
The National Guard played a significant domestic role before 9/11 in 
responding to state emergencies, WMD incidents and supporting LEA’s in drug 
control efforts.  After 9/11, Congress, DOD and the National Guard have 
leveraged their state emergency and WMD capabilities in order to provide an 
enhanced response to terrorist attacks.  In addition, NG Reaction Forces are 
being developed to provide a quick response to a terrorist attack.  The National 
Guard has not decided who will make up these forces.   
In this new security environment, the National Guard needs to focus more 
on leveraging three existing CD capabilities for the prevention of terrorist attacks. 
First, FSIVA teams can conduct vulnerability assessments, create crisis 
response plans for critical infrastructure protection and teach civilian 
organizations about protection measures.  The National Guard has not decided 
who will make up these teams.  Second, National Guard personnel can 
participate in state intelligence fusion centers passing intelligence analysis to 
new NG intelligence staff as well as NORTHCOM, NGB, and DOD.  Third, 
NORTHCOM requires interagency coordination to provide a synergistic multi-
agency effort to HLS. To assist with interagency coordination, NORTHCOM 
requires embedding DOD resources within the response plans of civilian 
agencies.  Except for counterdrug issues, the NG does not currently provide for 
interagency coordination with law enforcement agencies.  
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A survey was sent to the NG CD Coordinators in every state and territory 
to determine potential add-on HLS missions.  Some of the proposals are as 
follows:  develop an execution plan for LEA”s to use NG CD aviation assets, 
teach Law Enforcement Agencies involved in Counterterrorism as well as 
Counterdrug activities at the five NG CD schools, provide special operations 
aviation and ground support, conduct surveillance of Mexican and Canadian 
borders for suspicious terrorist activity, and conduct cargo and mail inspections 
at the borders scanning for drugs and terrorists.189 Several states found many 
similarities between duties associated with the CD and HLS missions. 
An already established integrated program in West Virginia provided a 
suitable model for conducting a case study to determine additional missions to 
supplement the NG CD Support Program in other states.  West Virginia has 
developed a comprehensive integrated CD-HLS program where soldiers 
participate in an Intelligence Fusion Center tracking both drug trafficking and 
suspicious activities.  Also, in West Virginia, CD ground reconnaissance teams 
have been cross-trained to assist with the FSIVA mission for the protection of 
critical infrastructure and also to teach terrorism awareness training programs.  
The West Virginia CD-HLS vulnerability assessment capability is not only dual-
use for HLS but can also be used by combatant commanders in other theaters.  
Challenges of CD-HLS integration were then explored in the areas of 
funding, personnel, and legal restrictions.  First, there are two funding 
challenges. The states lack stabilized funding for CD activities. The NG CD 
Support Program currently operates within a flat funding system that is 
insufficient for additional HLS tasks.  Also, centralized funding for CD activities 
may disappear if CD is integrated into HLS. Second, there are two personnel 
challenges.  There may be a requirement for additional personnel from some 
specialty areas.  In addition, there are more NG soldiers deployed today than 
ever before.  Third, Congress established the National Guard Counterdrug 
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Support Program in Section 112 of US Code Title 32, which states that NG CD 
personnel and equipment will be used “for the purpose of drug interdiction and 
counter-drug activities.”190  The law would need to be amended to authorize CD 
units to perform HLS missions. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CD-HLS INTEGRATION 
 
In order to make CD-HLS integration successful, there are two 
recommendations for the National Guard.  First, a CD-HLS integrated program 
needs to receive dedicated funding for a set number of people.  The CD Support 
Program currently receives annual funding from the President’s budget and 
Congressional appropriations. This money pays for salaries of CD personnel and 
maintaining CD equipment.  The number of people participating in the NG CD 
Support Program can vary from year to year since it is dependent on annual 
Congressional appropriations and the Department of Defense does not budget 
for pay raises.  In order to solve the challenge of having decreased growth in real 
dollars for the integrated program, funding for National Guard Counterdrug 
activities should be stabilized for a specific number of people.  In addition, to 
keep the CD program unique and to respond to the needs of the states and 
Congress, CD and HLS should each receive a fenced amount of funding with the 
ability to cross-level funding from CD to HLS up to a designated threshold.  In 
this way, when CD assets are used for HLS missions, the CD account will be 
reimbursed with HLS funds. 
Second, Congressional language should be amended and National Guard 
Regulation 500-2 should be expanded authorizing NG CD personnel to conduct 
HLS missions.  National Guard counterdrug personnel are already trained in 
military support to civil authorities and have established relationships with law 
enforcement agencies.  Dual-use of National Guard personnel and equipment 
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would result in a consolidated, cost-effective capability, which is a great benefit 
during a time of limited resources.191  
 
C. CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
 
There are two considerations for future study of CD-HLS integration.  First, 
the requirements of homeland security for the National Guard need to be 
determined.  Three and a half years after the shocking terrorist events in New 
York City and Washington, DC, the requirements for how the National Guard 
should adapt to meet this new threat remain unclear.  The Army has not changed 
its force structure to meet the new domestic terrorist threat.192  In fact, the Army 
is still optimized to fight two wars in two different theaters overseas based on a 
belief that this capability will also enable the force to be successful assisting 
civilian authorities respond to a major terrorist event within the United States.193   
The National Guard has consolidated its headquarters, both at the state 
and national levels, and is creating additional WMD-CSTs.  The National Guard 
also has efforts underway to create three additional force capability packages:  
Reaction Force, CBRNE Enhanced Response Force (CERF), and Full Spectrum 
Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (FSIVA) teams.  National Guard CD 
personnel can support homeland security efforts by providing capabilities for the 
Reaction Force and FSIVA teams and assisting with missions of interagency 
coordination, intelligence analysis and aerial and surface reconnaissance, among 
others.  However, until the actual HLS requirements are determined, to include 
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roles and mission of the National Guard, it is difficult to know where exactly to 
focus CD resources.   
Second, the National Guard performs a dual-role of supporting civilian 
authorities domestically and acting as a reserve for the Active Army and Air 
Force in the warfight overseas.  The balance between these two missions needs 
to be determined.  Since the 1940’s, the National Guard has been designed to 
perform its overseas combat role.194  However, since September 11, 2001, 
homeland security has become a more immediate and serious concern.  There is 
considerable debate, within the Pentagon and Congress, as to whether the NG 
should shift its balance and focus more heavily to its domestic security mission.  
As previously stated, NG CD support personnel are full-time, in ADSW status, 
during the week and then support their wartime units, in traditional status, on the 
weekends.  The National Guard has deployed more soldiers today than anytime 
in its history.  The balance of the National Guard between its domestic and 
overseas mission impacts CD-HLS integration because CD personnel can be 
deployed with their wartime unit leaving a shortfall in the CD-HLS program. 
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